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I. Introduction and Summary of Conclusions
A. Issues
Does the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1503 expand national
jurisdictions to handle crimes committed during the Rwandan genocide? The question
presumes that the Security Council has the power to change the domestic law of member
nations with its resolutions. To be sure, a given nation’s stance on the process of treaty
ratification would go directly to the heart of that question. An examination of the policies
of each Member State of the United Nations is clearly beyond the scope of this
memorandum.
After a brief survey of the relevant historical information, both with respect to the
resolutions in question and the genesis of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
(ICTR), an examination will be made as to what would be necessary for a country with a
system of treaty ratification like the one employed by the United States to view and
implement Security Council Resolutions as domestic law.
Secondly, this memorandum will undertake an investigation of the nature of the
power necessary for the United Nations (UN) and specifically the Security Council, to
expand the jurisdiction of domestic courts. This memorandum concludes that the
Security Council could compel States to make such changes by invoking either its powers
under article 71 of the UN Charter, or under the implied powers of Article 252.

1

UN CHARTER, ch. 7.

2

UN CHARTER, art. 25.

1

B. Summary of Conclusions
1. Security Council resolution 1503 which calls for referral of ICTR
and ICTY cases to national jurisdictions (and which was adopted, as
were the ICTY and ICTR statutes, pursuant to Chapter 7 of the
Charter of the United Nations), does not expand the jurisdiction of
these nations over the relevant crimes.
Resolution 1503 simply does not contain language specific enough to expand the
jurisdiction of a State over the relevant crimes. Reading the desired effect into the
resolution as written strains the capacity of the phrases.
2. The language of the resolution is inadequate, but can it be
remedied by a more explicit Security Council resolution.
The Security Council has been given broad powers by the UN Charter. While
these powers were effectively checked during the cold war due to the ever present threat
of a Soviet veto, they did not cease to exist. In order to facilitate the arrival of justice to
Rwanda, the Security Council can craft a resolution which expands the jurisdiction of
States to cover the relevant crimes.
Part II: Factual Background
A. The Birth of the ICTR and its role in Rwandan National Courts.3

An independent commission (The Commission) of experts convened, under
direction of the United Nations (UN) to establish the existence of grave breaches of
international humanitarian law.4 The Commission’s findings led to the creation of the

3

See generally Navanethem Pillay, WAR CRIMES TROBUNALS: THE RECORD AND THE
PROSPECTS: The Rwanda Tribunal and its Relationship to National Trials in Rwanda, 13 Am. U. Int’l L.
Rev. 1469 (1998). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II, at tab 21]

2

ICTR. Specifically, the commission stated that “there exists overwhelming evidence to
prove that acts of genocide against the Tutsi group were perpetrated in by Hutu elements
in a concerted, planned and systematic and methodical way.”5 The commission
concluded that genocide had taken place and recommended that the Security Council
create a tribunal to bring to justice the perpetrators.6 Resolution 955 of the Security
Council made good on the commission’s recommendation and created the ICTR.7
Importantly, even at this early stage, resolution 955 “decides that all States shall
cooperate fully with the International Tribunal and its organs…and that consequently all
States shall take any measures necessary to under their domestic law to implement the
provisions of the present resolution and the Statute.”8 The ICTR was created pursuant to
the powers granted to the UN under its own charter.9
B. Modernization of Rwandan Local courts10
For its new role on the prosecution of those connected to the genocide, the gacaca
court system was updated extensively.11 The government in Rwanda has tried to
differentiate the new gacaca courts by calling them either “modernized gacaca,” or as
4

S.C. Res. 935, U.N. SCOR 3400th mtg.at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/935 (1994) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook II, at tab 34]

5

6

U.N. Doc. S/1994/1125, at 30. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II, at tab 36]
Id. at 31.

7

S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR 3453th mtg.at 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [Reproduced in accompanying
notebook II, at tab 23]

8

Id. at 2.

9

See generally U.N. Charter art. 39, 41, 48. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II, at tab 17]

10

See generally Erin Daly, Between Punitive and Reconstructive Justice: The Gacaca Courts in Rwanda, 34
N.Y.U. J. Int’l L & Pol. 355 (2002) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I, at tab 16]

11

L. Danielle Tully, Human Rights Compliance and the Gacaca Jurisdictions in Rwanda, 26 B.C. Int’l &
Comp. L. Rev. 385, 398. (2003). [Reproduced in the Accompanying notebook II, at tab 38]

3

“gacaca jurisdictions.”12 The complimentarity of gacaca jurisdictions and the ICTR is
not complete, as gacaca courts are limited to hearing offenses that fall into categories 2,
3, and 4.13 These new courts, while not perfect in the implementation of the applicable
law, represent the first best effort to achieve real justice in Rwanda.14
Even though there exists extensive shared jurisdiction between the gacaca courts
and the ICTR, indeed, there have been times when both the same person has been sought
by both systems.15 The statute of the ICTR explicitly gives the tribunal primacy over
Rwandan national courts.16 It reads in relevant part, “The International Tribunal for
Rwanda shall have primacy over the national courts of all States. At any stage of the
procedure, the…Tribunal for Rwanda may formally request national courts to its
competence in accordance with the present Statute…”17 This notion of a tribunal having
primacy over the relevant State courts represents a change from earlier UN doctrine. A
1972 General Assembly resolution asserts “that every State shall have the right to try its
own nationals for war crimes or crimes against humanity.”18

12

Id at 398. Citing Peter Uvin, The Introduction of a Modernized Gacaca for Judging Suspects of
Participation in the Genocide and the Massacres of 1994 in Rwanda (2000) (unpublished manuscript on
file with the Boston College International & Comparative Law Review until May, 2004)

13

Organic law no. 40/2000 at art 2. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II, at tab 35]

14

Supra note 11 at 414.

15

See Philip Gourevitch, Justice in Exile, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1996, at A15[Reproduced in the
accompanying notebook I, at tab 13]; as cited by Madeline H. Morris, Symposium: Justice in cataclysmic
criminal trials in the wake of mass violence: Article: the trials of concurrent jurisdiction: the case of
Rwanda, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 349, 364. (1997) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I, at tab
13].
16

Supra note 7. at Art. 8 §2.

17

Id.

18

G.A. Res. 3074, U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 18 at 2., U.N. Doc. A/9018 (1973). [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook II, at tab 22]

4

Even with two venues to try those charged, progress has been slow, delivering
what has been called “justice delayed.”19 As it stands now, the ICTR is handling a small
fraction of the trials while leaving the lion’s share to local Rwandan jurisdictions.20
C. Limitations of the ICTR
The ICTR was created with fairly narrow geographical and temporal limitations.
Its statute confines its jurisdiction to crimes committed in violation of international
humanitarian law in the territory of Rwanda and neighboring States during the period of
“1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.”21 While some have called for the elimination
of a territorial connection requirement, and the allowance for the prosecution of all those
affiliated with the genocide.22 That avenue of inquiry is beyond the scope of this
memorandum.
The statute of the ICTR also acknowledges and provides for the presence of
concurrent jurisdiction.23 The relevant text reads: “The international Tribunal for
Rwanda and national courts shall have concurrent jurisdiction…”24 Indeed, the Rwandan
national court system was rebuilt with an eye towards prosecuting crimes of committed

19

Madeline H. Morris, Symposium: Justice in cataclysmic criminal trials in the wake of mass violence:
Article: the trials of concurrent jurisdiction: the case of Rwanda, 7 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 349, 374.
(1997). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II, at tab 15]

20

Id. at 367

21

Supra note 7, at 1.

22

Open letter from Avocats sans Frontiers to the U.N. Security Council, regarding the need to expand the
jurisdiction of the ICTR. As cited by Shawn Smith, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: An
Analysis on Jurisdiction, 23 T. Marshall L. Rev. 231 (1997), [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
III, at tab 51].
23

Supra note 7. at 8.

24

Id.

5

during the aforementioned period of time.25 These gacaca courts are deeply rooted in the
Rwandan system of dispute resolution.26 The community based system of dispute
resolution was extant in pre-colonial Rwanda,27 and even managed to function during the
period when the acts of genocide were being committed.28
D. The Completion Strategy of the ICTR
The completion strategy of the ICTR found in a letter from the tribunal’s
president to the president of the Security Council29 contains language discussing the
transfer, by the prosecutor, to national jurisdictions.30 At the time of the writing of the
completion strategy, 41 persons were earmarked for transfer to other States.31 It goes on
to discuss several difficulties that have arisen, or are likely to arise in the transfer of
defendants to other States for trial. In some cases, the laws of a State where a prisoner is
present may not include the relevant crimes.32 In other States, the case may have been
effectively closed with the local authorities reluctant to re-open the investigation.33
Further complicating the situation is that many of the States that have been called upon to

25

26

27

Supra note 11 at 392
Id. at 396
Id.

28

Id. at 397.

29

U.N. Doc. S/2004/341 [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II at tab 20]

30

Id. at §6.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

Id.

6

assist the ICTR are less developed countries whose judicial systems are already being
stressed attempting to handle purely local cases.34
Even transfers to Rwandan control are not without their problems.35 First, the
Rwandan courts are already crowded with cases associated with the genocide.36
Secondly, the Rwandan courts recognize the death penalty, whereas the ICTR does not.37
The completion strategy ends the discussion of transfer by stating that the prosecutor
“will initiate discussions with States regarding transfer of cases…”38
At the very least, there should not be any questions of legality concerning the
transfer of indictees to Rwandan courts. This assertion is based on the fact that the
Rwandan Constitution does not prohibit retroactive offenses provided that the offenses
are considered to be criminal by the international community.39

E. Comparisons to the International Criminal Tribunal For Yugoslavia
(ICTY)

The completion strategy of the ICTR is very similar to the one employed by the
ICTY. Indeed, the resolutions to be discussed are equally applicable to both tribunals.

34

Id.

35

See generally Brent Wible, DE-JEOPARDIZING”: DOMESTIC PROSECUTIONS FOR
INTERNATIONAL CRIMES AND THE NEED FOR TRANSNATIONAL CONVERGENCE, 31 Denv. J. Int’l
L. & Pol’y 265 (2002). [Reproduced in accompanying notebook I, at tab 4]

36

Id.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

William A. Schabas, PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIME: Justice, Democracy, and Impunity in
Post-Genocide Rwanda: Searching for Solutions to Impossible Problems, 7 Crim. L.F. 523, 536,537 (1996)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook II, at tab 25].
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However, comparisons between the two tribunals as to their respective capacities to
transfer indictees to domestic jurisdictions are of a limited value.
From the moment of their respective inceptions, the relationship between the
tribunals and domestic jurisdictions has been different. In the case of the ICTR, it was
conceived and developed to function with Rwandan local courts. Certainly, it has always
had primacy over the domestic courts of Rwanda, but as discussed above, the Rwandan
domestic court system was re-built with an eye towards to handling some of the cases
associated with the genocide.
By comparison, the ICTY was originally conceived and developed to exist as a
wholly supra-national device. Importantly, the discussion of transferring ICTY cases to
domestic jurisdiction has been limited to transfers of States of the former Yugoslavia.40
In the Ninth Report to the United Nations, the possible transfer of certain cases is

40

Ninth Report to the United Nations on the ICTY, U.N. Doc. S/2002/985, para 326-327 (Sept. 4, 2002).
“326. In addition, during the period, the Tribunal, mindful of its ad hoc status, entered into a process of
joint reflection involving its three principal organs in order to honour the commitments it made to the
Security Council, that is, to complete the investigations in 2004 and first instance trials in 2008. In that
regard, the gradual re-establishment of democratic institutions in the States of the former Yugoslavia and
the reforms of the judicial systems undertaken with the international community's assistance made it
possible to contemplate the implementation of a process of referral of certain cases to national courts. From
this perspective, the Tribunal intends to concentrate its activity on trying the major political and military
leaders and referring cases involving intermediary-level accused to national courts, in particular, those of
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Thus, the President and Prosecutor advocated the establishment of a chamber
with jurisdiction to try the accused whose cases the International Tribunal will refer within the State Court
of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They also proposed that the local court personnel, prosecutors and judges
receive training in international humanitarian law since this law is constantly evolving and becoming
increasingly complex. Since they must ensure that the national courts operate in all fairness with respect for
the international norms for the protection of human rights and in keeping with the Statute of the Tribunal,
the President and the Prosecutor considered the possibility of international observers and judges
participating in the work of the national courts.
327. The International Tribunal cannot perform alone the work of justice and memory required for
rebuilding a national identity. Consequently, it encouraged the States of the former Yugoslavia to take
parallel action so that they fully participate in bolstering the work of justice accomplished and, by the same
token, building peace and reconciliation in the region, a vital process. The reforms related to the Tribunal's
completion strategy thus put forward a model of complementary justice which involves domestic courts in
the work of international courts.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III, at tab 50]

8

discussed.41 The report speaks to “building peace and reconciliation,” through
encouragement of the “States of the former Yugoslavia to take a parallel track.”42
This is important for two reasons. Under the theories of universal jurisdiction, all
ICTY indictees would have a legally cognizable connection to the new States.43
In contrast, if the ICTR were to transfer indictees to domestic jurisdictions, it
would almost assuredly include transfers to States that have far more limited, if not nonexistent ties to the Rwandan genocide. This means that a discussion of transferring cases
from the ICTR to other State jurisdictions must be based upon a different legal
background.
F. The Role of Security Council Resolutions
The completion strategy was written and its deadlines established by looking to
two Security Council Resolutions that call upon the ICTR to finish its work by 2010.44
Also contained within these resolutions are passages that mention the utilization of other
national jurisdictions to aid in the completion of the ICTR’s work. Resolution 1503 reads
on relevant part: “Urging the ICTR to formalize a detailed strategy…to transfer cases
involving intermediate- and lower-rank accused to competent national jurisdictions, as
appropriate, including Rwanda…”45 Additionally, resolution 1534 “calls on the…ICTR
41

Id.

42

Id.

43

See also Michael Bohlander, Last Exit Bosnia – Transferring War Crimes Prosecution From the
International Tribunal To Domestic Courts, 14 Crim. L.F. 59 (2003). The article does not discuss legal
issues as is done here, but rather discusses the practical and pragmatic concerns that are inherent in
efficiently and ethically transferring prosecution to states scarred by the conflicts that those charged were a
part of. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II, at tab 28]
44

S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. SCOR 4817th mtg.at 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (2003) [Reproduced in
accompanying notebook II, at tab 19]; S.C. Res. 1534, U.N. SCOR 4935th mtg.at 3, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534
(1994) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II, at tab 34].
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prosecutor to review the case load…with a view to determining which cases should be
proceeded with and which should be transferred to competent national jurisdictions.”46
III. Legal Analysis.
A. Security Council Resolutions Under U.S. law.
The United States, with its well developed legal system, can serve as a model for
understanding the kinds of demands that will be placed upon resolutions before they can
be incorporated into U.S. law. Although different States around the world react and
implement treaties (e.g. the UN Charter) and subsequent products of those treaties (e.g.
resolutions of the Security Council) in different ways, the standards that the U.S would
apply can still be useful as a limited guide to what a similarly situated State would
require.
Under the laws of the United States, a ratified treaty to which the U.S. is a
signatory is considered part of the supreme law of the land.47 Subject to the doctrine of
self-execution, a treaty need not require additional government action to become law.48
1. Doctrine of Self-Execution
Current case law articulates three parts to the doctrine of self-execution. That is,
three case specific ways to establish whether or not a given treaty is self-executing.49 The

45

Id.
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Id at 4.
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U.S. Const. art 4. “All treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme law of the land…” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook I, at tab 1].
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Edwin F. Feo, Self-execution of United Nations Security Council Resolutions Under United States Law,
24 UCLA L. Rev. 387, 390 (1976-1977) [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II, at tab 32]
See Also James R. Nafzinger & Edward M. Wise, The Status in United States Law of Security Council
Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 46 Am. J. Comp. L. 421 (1998).
[Reproduced in accompanying notebook II, at tab 31]
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first of these tools of interpretation looks to the language of the document. If the
document requires a “future action,” by the executive or legislative branches, then it can
reliably be considered to not be self-executing.50 The intent of the signatories has been
held to be controlling when it comes to deciding if a treaty was meant to be construed as
self-executing.51
2. The Need For Self-Executing Legislation
Secondly, it is important to look for the existence of any implementing
legislation.52 If a treaty is made the subject of domestic legislation, then the passing of
that legislation must take place before the treaty can be considered implemented.53
However, non-ratified treaties are often used to aid courts in the process of statutory
interpretation.54 While use of a non-ratified treaty to interpret a statute does afford even
non-ratified treaties a modicum of power in the U.S. system, the power of a ratified treaty
is clearly preferable,
3. Portions Left to Congress
Thirdly, if the treaty concerns an area of law that is traditionally left to Congress.
Specifically, “treaties on patents, criminal offenses,55 and appropriations have been held
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Id.
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Id. at 391.
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Id.
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Id.
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Beharry v. Reno 183 F.Supp.2d 584, *593 (E.D.N.Y.,2002) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook
III, at tab 42].
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The Over the Top, 5 F.2d 838, 845. Containing the following relevant language: “Now the grant by one
sovereign to another of the right to seize its nationals upon the high seas without process and by force
majeure for crimes committed by those nationals against the offended sovereign, by no means declares that
those acts when committed on the high seas constitute such crimes. If, before this treaty was contracted, the
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to be non-self-executing.”56 It is worthy to note that only the appropriation of funds is
constitutionally forbidden to be dealt with via treaty.57
The treatment of Security Council resolutions in domestic U.S. courts is often
premised on the notion that because the UN Charter is not entirely self-executing,
products of Security Council must also be scene as not inherently self-executing.58
However, if a Security Council Resolution is paired with a concurrent executive
order to enforce it, the resolution would then be considered a federal statute and subject
to constitutional guarantees.59 The case from which this conclusion can be derived is
Diggs v. Schultz.60 Which in relevant part reads: “in 1966, the Security Council of the
United Nations, with the affirmative vote of the United States, adopted Resolution 232
directing that all member States impose an embargo on trade with Southern Rhodesia -- a
step which was reaffirmed and enlarged in 1968. In compliance with this resolution, the
Executive Orders 11322 and 11419 were issued, establishing criminal sanctions for
violation of the embargo under 22 U.S.C.S. § 287c.”61 The text of the resolutions and the
accompanying executive order are in this case irrelevant. For the present purpose, it is

unlading of merchandise by a ship of British registry at a point more than four leagues removed from the
coast of the United States did not constitute a crime against the United States (and there appears to be no
contention that it did), then the treaty could not and did not make it a crime (emphasis added).
56

Supra note 40, at 399.
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Supra note 47, “all bills raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives.”
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People of Saipan v. United States Dep’t of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 100 (9th Cir. 1974), cert denied, 420
U.S. 1003 (1975) Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III, at tab 43]; Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F.
Supp. 390, 393 (D.D.C. 1958), aff’d, 278 F. 2d 252 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 835 (1960)
[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III, at tab 44]; Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617
(1952). As cited by Supra note 39. at 410.[Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III, at tab 40].
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Diggs v. Schultz 470 F.2d 461. [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III, at tab 52]
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sufficient to note that the court imputed the force of a statute to the resolutions on the
grounds that the executive order had removed the need to consider whether they were self
executing or not.62
B. A Textual Analysis of the Resolutions63
Additionally, the language of the resolutions can be examined to establish if they
are self-executing or not.64 In Sei Fujii v. State, the court looked to the language of the
UN Charter in article 104 to show when the framers wanted something to be selfexecuting. Article 104 reads: “The Organization shall enjoy in the territory of each of its
Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise of its functions and the
fulfillment of its purposes.”65 This requirement can be read as a test for “specificity.”66
1. Resolution 1503
Analyzing the applicable Security Council resolutions yields a mixed result. The
first mentioning of help from other States contained in Resolution 1503 calls the “full
cooperation by all States” an “essential prerequisite to achieving all objectives of
the…ICTR.”67 This language is then partially qualified by the following: “especially in

62

Supra note 48. at 407.

63

The International Court of Justice has also noted the importance of the text of a resolution in establishing
its binding force, “The language of a resolution of the Security Council should be carefully analysed (sic)
before a conclusion can be made as to its binding effect.” Legal Consequences for States of the Continued
Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970) 1971 I.C.J. 16, *53

64
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Supra note 48. at 412, Pauling v. McElroy, 164 F. Supp. 390
Supra note 48, at Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal. 2d 718 at 724.
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Supra note 64.

67

Supra note 44.

13

apprehending all remaining at large persons indicted by the…ICTR.”68 This first portion
does not seem to be able to pass the specificity test. To note that “full cooperation,” is
required does not provide the reader with a detailed idea of what is required. It may be
implicit that the expansion of domestic jurisdictions is entailed in the idea of “full
cooperation,” but it is by no means incontrovertibly present in that statement. Further,
the last subordinate clause of the quoted paragraph could be read to limit the idea of “full
cooperation,” to assisting the ICTR in apprehending those that have already been
indicted. The expansion of domestic jurisdictions can be read into the cited portion, but it
is not explicitly there.
Later in the same resolution the Security Council “Urges the ICTR to formalize a
detailed completion strategy…to transfer cases to competent national jurisdictions.”69
Here. The operative word is “competent.” Appropriate jurisdiction is no doubt a part of
judicial competency, but the requirement of competency does not include within it an
affirmative command for the expansion of jurisdictions. If it compels anything, it
instructs the ICTR to the carefully examine the domestic court systems where they would
propose to transfer some of their cases.
The next part of the Resolution invokes the powers granted to the UN under
Chapter 7 of the charter. Importantly, under Chapter 7, “The Security Council may
decide what measures not involving the use of armed force are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions”70 At least in theory, if Resolution 1503 were interpreted to be

68
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U.N. CHARTER art. 41, para. 1. [Reproduced in accompanying notebook II, at tab 17]
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binding in its requests from member nations, the Security Council could apply sanctions
to noncompliant States.71 An analysis of possible actions of the Security Council under
such a circumstance is beyond the scope of this memorandum.
With that in mind, the following portions of the resolution could be interpreted to
carry the force of UN action behind them in the face of non-compliance. The Resolution
“calls upon the international community to assist national jurisdictions…”72 The implicit
presumption of this section is that some nations have already expanded their national
jurisdictions to include persons indicted by the ICTR. It carries with it no affirmative
command for other jurisdictions to likewise expand their capacity. Additionally, calling
upon the international community to “assist,” national jurisdictions is line with the
presumption that some other nations have already expanded their jurisdiction, but is
hardly a command for nations that have not expanded their jurisdiction to do so.
The most compelling language that appears in the resolution “calls on all States,
specifically Rwanda, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and the Republic of
the Congo to intensify cooperation with and render all necessary assistance to the ICTR
(emphasis added.)”73 The all inclusive nature of the phrase, “all necessary assistance,” if
read literally, by default would include the expansion of domestic jurisdictions if such
assistance were deemed necessary. Yet this too is potentially limited by a very specific
qualifier in the attendant subordinate clause. The relevant text reads as follows;
“including on investigations of the Rwandan Patriotic Army and efforts to bring Felician
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Supra note 44. at 1.
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Id at 3.
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Kabuga and all other such indictees to the ICTR.”74 To the author of this memo, there
are two ways to interpret the addition of this specific requirement to the broad idea of “all
necessary assistance.”
First, it can be seen, not as a limitation on the idea of “all necessary assistance,”
but simply as an addendum to harp on one of the pressing needs of the ICTR. The fact
that the specific language is attached to the rest of the statement with the word
“including,” lends support to this idea. A dictionary investigation as to the scope of the
meaning of the word “include,” yields the following relevant information.75 The word
‘include,’ most probably is being used to denote a partial list of what is being requested
and of whom. In effect, that the word “include,” joins the broad idea of “all necessary
assistance,” to the much narrower specific request to aid in the investigation and
procurement of idictees might have been a conscious effort by the drafters not to limit the
scope of the former with an all inclusive notion of what type of aid was to be rendered.
Put another way, if the cited passage had read been written with a construction based
upon the word ‘comprise,’ and not ‘include,’ then the clause could more readily be
interpreted to limit the scope of the idea of aid to rendering investigative assistance. As it
is written, it is at best a non-exhaustive mentioning of a form of aid to be rendered. At
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THE AMERICAN HERITAGE COLLEGE DICTIONARY 687 (3d ed. 1997) “Some writers insist that
include be used only when it is followed by a partial list of the contents of the referent of the subject.
Therefore, one may write New England includes Connecticut and Rhode Island, but one must use comprise
or consist of to provide full enumeration: New England comprises (not includes) Connecticut, Rhode
Island, Massachusetts, Vermont, New Hampshire, and Maine. This restriction is too strong. Include does
not rule out the possibility of a complete listing. Thus the sentence The bibliography should include all the
journal articles you have used does not entail that the bibliography must contain something other than
journal articles, though it does leave that possibility open. The use of comprise or consist of, however, will
avoid ambiguity when a listing is meant to be exhaustive. Thus the sentence The task force includes all of
the Navy units on active duty in the region allows for the possibility that Marine and Army units are also
taking part, where the same sentence with comprise would entail that the task force contained only Navy
forces.” [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III, at tab 57].
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worst, it is an ambiguous addendum that may or may not limit the scope of the aid to be
rendered.
The second way to read the addition of a specific qualifier to the broad statement
that opens the passage is that it was meant only to apply to the countries mentioned.
With this interpretation, the aid requested of States not specifically mentioned is as
written “all necessary aid.” It seems unlikely that this language would satisfy the
aforementioned specificity test. As such, in US courts, resolution 1503 would likely not
be seen as self-executing.
2. Resolution 1534
Resolution 1534,76 likely does not pass the specificity requirement either. It
contains largely the same assertions as resolution 1503 with the following addition. Prior
to the phrase, “render all necessary assistance,”77 it calls upon “all States to intensify
cooperation (emphasis added)…with the ICTR.”78 If the idea of “all necessary
asisstance,” does not on its face include the idea of intensive cooperation, it seems as
though it should be read as facially meaningless. Under this interpretation, the cited
Security Council resolutions do not on contain language specific enough to expand the
jurisdictions of other States. Under this interpretation, jurisdictional expansion could
only take place if the cited resolutions had included something like the following text:
“Reaffirms the necessity of trial of persons by the ICTR and reiterates its call on
all states especially, but not limited to, Rwanda, Kenya, the Democratic Republic
of the Congo and the Republic of the Congo to render all necessary assistance to
the ICTR, including, but not limited to, whatever jurisdictional expansion is
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necessary to try inditess that the ICTR seeks to transfer in accordance with its
completion strategy.”79
This language would succeed in two principle areas where the actual text is too
ambiguous to conclusively expand the jurisdictions of other nations. First, the emphasis
on cooperation by other African countries in the region of the ICTR is preserved, but it
avoids the interpretation that those countries were supposed to be the exclusive focus of
the text.
Additionally, the scope of the assistance cannot be read to be limited to the
apprehension and transfer of indictees found abroad. If these textual changes were
included in a subsequent resolution, the troublesome ambiguities mentioned would not be
present.
C. Security Council Resolutions that Have Changed Laws.
The Security Council has previously passed resolutions that have compelled
member States to take very pointed steps to be in compliance. After the bombing of Pan
Am flight 103, the Security Council passes resolutions that required Libya to respond in a
way that was arguably incompatible with its domestic responsibilities under a preexisting treaty. More recently, after the terrorist attacks against the U.S. on September
11, 2001, resolutions were passed which required States to, inter alia, criminalize acts of
terrorism.
1. Resolutions Surrounding the Libyan bombing of Pan Am 103
After a three year investigation into the bombing of Pan American Flight 103 led
investigators from the U.S. and U.K. to conclude that the terrorists were Libyan agents,
the investigating governments demanded that Libya extradite the suspects so they could
79

Suggested text based on the text of Res. 1534 at 2.
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be brought to trial.80 In the face of Libyan non-cooperation, the Security Council passed
a number of resolutions that became increasingly direct in their language.81
First among these was Resolution 731 passed on January 21, 1992.82 The
language of this first Resolution, suffers from many of the language based inadequacies
discussed above. In lieu of demanding a form of specific compliance (i.e., extradition of
the suspects), it “Strongly deplores the fact that the Libyan government has not yet
responded effectively…”83 The Resolution then goes on to “urge,” the government of
Libya to “immediately provide a full and effective response…”84 An even more oblique
responsibility is levied upon the international community as a whole, where all States are
“urged…individually and collectively to encourage the Libyan Government to provide a
full and effective response…”85 Three days prior, Libya sought relief with the
International Court of Justice.86 This request for provisional measures was premised on
alleged violations of the Montreal convention by the U.S. and the U.K.., this request was
denied by the court.87
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2. Domestic Law v. Resolutions
Subsequent Security Council Resolutions are important to the matter at hand for
the following two reasons. 1). They order the government of Libya to take actions which
may violate its domestic extraditions laws, and 2) the Security Council points to article
VII of the UN Charter for the authority to do so. 88
Resolution 748 builds on the language of Resolution 731 and “Decides that the
Libyan Government must now comply without further delay with paragraph 3 of
resolution 731…”89 and severely limits the capacity of other States to engage with
Libya.90
The language most important to the task at hand appears at paragraph 7, which
reads:
“…all States, including States not members of the United Nations, and all
international organizations, to act strictly in accordance with the provisions of the
present resolution, notwithstanding the existence of any rights or obligations
conferred or imposed by any international agreement or any contract entered into
or any license or permit…”91
Here, the Security Council is asserting a power very similar to that which would be
required to compel States to alter their jurisdiction to try cases assigned to them from the
ICTR. In this case, the Security Council is calling upon states to disregard pre-existing
international obligations to comply with a very pointed resolution. To the extent that
domestic jurisdictional laws can be considered analogous to obligations arising from
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international agreements, the power of the UN to craft a resolution demanding States to
expand the scope of their domestic jurisdiction would seem manifest.
Indeed, Libya continued to pursue its claim through the ICJ. In its opinion
refusing to grant provisional measures, the ICJ provides some very useful language. In
the portion of the opinion written by judge Oda, the following appears:
I do not deny that under the positive law of the United Nations Charter a
resolution of the Security Council may have binding force, irrespective of the
question whether it is consonant with international law derived from other
sources. There is certainly nothing to oblige the Security Council, acting within its
terms of reference, to carry out a full evaluation of the possibly relevant rules and
circumstances before proceeding to the decisions it deems necessary. The Council
appears, in fact, to have been acting within its competence when it discerned a
threat against international peace and security in Libya's refusal to deliver up the
two Libyan accused.92

Here, there are two points worthy of mention. The cited portion, acknowledges the
Security Council’s power to create an obligation that may require a State to act in
violation of pre-existing, though inferior international obligations. Additionally, the
authority to do so comes from the Council’s article VII of the charter.
D. Resolutions Passed in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11/2001
1. Key differences between this resolution and previous resolutions.
On September 28, 2001, the Security Council passed a resolution that
“establish(ed) new binding rules of international law.”93 In contrast to the previously
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31 I.L.M. 662, *673, INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: ORDER WITH REGARD TO
REQUEST FOR THE INDICATION OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN THE CASE CONCERNING
QUESTIONS OF INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE 1971 MONTREAL
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cited resolutions, Security Council Resolution 1373 is written with much more specific
requirements for a State to be in compliance.94 The resolution begins the operative
portion of the text by invoking the article VII95 powers of the Security Council under
which the council is given broad latitude to “restore international peace and security.”96
The resolution, quickly and in certain terms, specifies what States are to do to
combat global terrorism. The language used to introduce the actions that are to be taken,
is clear and concise. It reads: “[A]ll states shall.” 97 The list of what States are required
to do per the resolution is longer than need be discussed here. There is however, a
portion extremely relevant to the instant question. States are required to “criminalize the
willful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of fund by their
nationals or in their territories with the intention that the intention that the funds should
be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to carry out terrorist
acts.”98 Further on in the resolution, the following text appears, all States are to
“ensure…[that] terrorist acts are established as serious criminal offenses in domestic laws
and regulations and that the punishment duly reflects the seriousness of such terrorist
acts.”99 On its face, the resolution appears to do something very similar to what can, only
with difficulty, be read into the resolutions that have been discussed previously.
also has a broader scope in that it is not limited to the requiring actions (or inaction) with respect to specific
country.) [Reproduced in the accompanying notebook III, at tab 58]
94
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Resolution 1373 requires all States to make specific, and potentially, very significant
changes to domestic laws.
Is the question then settled? Can the jurisdiction of all States be changed by an
appropriately direct edict from the Security Council? The answer, it would appear is
‘yes,’ and ‘no,’ or perhaps a heavily qualified ‘maybe.’ The rules put forth in resolution
1373 were not created in an instant and in fact were promulgated in various resolutions
passed by the General Assembly. While this point is not legally significant,100 it does
suggest that the Security Council was building on a pre-existing global desire to codify
criminally acts of terrorism. Of course, a similar point could be made with respect to
human rights law. Beginning with the Genocide Convention of 1949 up through the
present, the United Nations has always had the protection of human rights as a goal.101
B. The Legality of Such Resolutions Under the UN Charter
The capacity of the Security Council to pass resolutions that bind Member States
to a specific course of action can hardly be disputed. Both the resolutions dealing with
the Libyan situation and the anti-terrorism resolution speak to that idea. But were those
actions legal? Would a resolution expanding the jurisdiction of domestic courts fall
within the powers granted to the Security Council under article VII? The answer appears
to be yes.

100

Supra note 93 at 903.
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is in the adoption and proclamation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948.
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1. Under Chapter VII102
The larger question is does the UN have the power to expand the power of
domestic State statutes to include crimes that would fall into the idea of universal
jurisdiction. At least one commentator in looking to a similar question has said ‘yes.’103
Further, with the end of the cold war, a consensus has arisen in the Security Council that
destructive, but internal, affairs of States fall within the scope the Council’s power.104
The foundation of a discussion about the scope of the power of the Security
Council is an examination of the mandate that created it.105 The UN Charter article 39
provides the following language: “The Security Council shall determine the existence of
any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41
and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.”106 It was on the basis of
this power that the ICTR and the ICTY were created.107 As such, the argument that the
Security Council has the power to make jurisdictional changes to the domestic court

102

Sheila O’Shea, Interaction Between International Criminal Tribunals and National Legal Systems, 28
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system would read like this. In order to avoid a breach of the peace, it is essential that
those charged in connection with the Rwandan genocide are brought to justice in a timely
manner, consistent with the completion strategy of the ICTR.
Even though it could be argued that an action to expand the jurisdiction of
member States was not considered as part of the mission of the Security Council, in
looking at the Security Council’s capacity to create novel solutions to problems that are
judged to threaten the peace, that argument does not carry enough weight to be viable.108
A similar argument was raised and dismissed in an attempt to discredit the ICTY, on the
grounds that the Security Council has broad powers under Art. VII. Specifically, the
tribunal noted that no good reason had been advanced as why the creation of a tribunal to
adjudicate crimes against humanity should be read as excluded from the power found in
Art. 41 of the Charter. Article 41 presents a limited list of what the Security Council may
do in the face of an ascertained threat to the peace, it states that action “may include
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal,
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic
relations.”109 Once the existence of a threat to the peace has been determined, the only real
limitation applied by Art. 41, is that armed forces may not be used. The tribunal goes on
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Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic, Case No. XX-XX-X-XXXX, para 27. (Aug. 10, 1995) “That it was not
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to assert that the punishment of those found guilty of violations of “international
humanitarian law,”110 is helping to ensure international peace and security.
A parallel line of logic could be applied here. If, the creation of the ICTR was
necessary for the protection of international peace and security, then the functionality of
the ICTR would be a critical component. At present, the ICTR has indicated that in order
to comply with its own completion strategy a portion of its caseload must be transferred
to competent domestic jurisdictions. To the extent that the ICTR was created to protect
peace, any and all UN powers that were invoked to allow for its creation, would be
equally applicable to measures designed to ensure its success.
2. Under Chapter V, Art. 25
If the widely used powers found in chapter VII of the UN Charter are deemed
insufficient to authorize the expansion of domestic jurisdictions, the Security Council
could also exercise the general implied powers found in Art. 25.111 In a 1971 opinion, the
International Court of Justice found that States were bound by actions taken by the
Security Council pursuant to Art. 25.112
The ICJ concluded that when the Security Council adopts a resolution pursuant to
its powers under Art. 25, “it is for Member States to comply with that decision, including
those members of the Security Council that voted against it and those Members of the
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United Nations who are not Members of the Council.113 To hold otherwise would be to
deprive this principle organ of its essential functions under the Charter.”114
The ICJ’s broad interpretation of the Security Council’s powers has not been
universally accepted.115 It has been argued that the notions of state sovereignty and the
power of Security Council conflict with one another in instances such as these. That is to
say that both concepts are reaching for a place of dominance over the other and that an
increase in the power of one must be met by a corresponding decrease in power by the
other.116 Thus, if one reads the expansion of domestic jurisdiction by order of the
Security Council as an abrogation of State sovereignty, it would have to have been done
by a grant (either implicit or explicitly) of increased authority to the Security Council.
My research has indicated that the tension between traditional notions of state
sovereignty and the power of the UN is far from settled as such a resolution as has been
discussed here would likely be contentious in some states.117
Part III: In the age of Universal Jurisdiction, are Security Council Resolutions
needed to Expand the jurisdiction of other states?

On its face, if universal jurisdiction were truly valid and accepted through the
world, then resolutions requiring States to expand their domestic jurisdiction would be
redundant. For a variety of reasons, this is simply not the case. While an examination of
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every States jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this memorandum, a carefully chosen
look to the reality of universal jurisdiction in some States is not. This section begins with
a brief discussion of universal jurisdiction in the world as a whole. This is followed by a
look at the status of universal jurisdiction in the courts of Switzerland and Australia. The
varied interpretations of universal jurisdiction at both the State and academic levels
shows both the necessity and the opportunity for unifying UN action.
A. Universal Jurisdiction and the ICTR.
As a preliminary formality, it seems necessary to point out that the ICTR has
invoked the idea and power of universal jurisdiction to aid in its prosecutorial efforts.
Specifically, in the case of The Prosecutor v. Ntuyhahga, the trial chamber stated:
“[T]he tribunal wishes to emphasize, in line with the General Assembly and the
Security Council of the United Nations, that it encourages all States, in
application of the principle of Universal Jurisdiction, to prosecute and judge those
responsible for serious crimes such as genocide, crimes against humanity and
other grave violations of international humanitarian law.”118
The quoted passage contains several presumptions worthy of examination. The scope of
this memorandum being limited, my investigation will be limited to the viability of
universal jurisdiction to prosecute like those cited, paying specific attention to those
States that have tried or attempted to try individuals connected with the Rwandan
genocide.
Additionally, the annual reports issued by the ICTR to the UN have indicated an
intention to assign indictees to domestic jurisdictions.119 However, the language of the
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reports has not always been consistent. In the most recent report, the Prosecutor
“recommends that Member States remain receptive to discussions relating to the transfer
of cases to their respective jurisdictions.” Earlier reports that speak to the notion of
transferring cases to domestic jurisdictions do so in a much more certain manner stating
that a portion of those indicted, and being considered for transfer, were already “in
countries that have adopted the principle of universal jurisdiction…[and] they could be
tried there.”120 No explanation is given for the change in language.
B. A Brief Discussion of Universal Jurisdiction
The concept of universal jurisdiction allows for the prosecution of war crimes
regardless of the nationality of the victim, the place where the crime was committed or
the time that the war had begun.121 It has been said that “some offenses, due to their very
nature, affect the interests of all States.”122 The London Conference of the International
Law Association concluded that the primary rationale for universal jurisdiction was
justice and not deterrence as some other commentators had suggested.123
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In a move relevant to the task at hand, the London Conference concluded that the
crime of genocide as defined by the 1948 genocide convention (the convention) would be
eligible for prosecution within the framework of universal jurisdiction. Universal
jurisdiction is not specifically addressed in the convention, however the convention cited
widespread acceptance of the customary international law that allowed for genocide to be
subject to universal jurisdiction.124
The London Conference credits the creation and relative success of both the ICTR
and the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia with being “the principle
motivating force behind the increased willingness of states to try perpetrators of war
crimes.”125
However, the London Conferences enthusiasm does seem a bit misplaced. In the
appendix that follows the article, a summary of the status of genocide/crimes against
humanity in the thirteen States that have included the crimes in their laws shows a very
mixed picture.126 In Australia (as will be discussed below) no person can be tried for
genocide.127 Austrian courts, on the other hand have jurisdiction to try cases brought
through universal jurisdiction.128 It points to the expansive jurisdiction asserted by
Belgium that has led to no prosecutions as evidence that the power of the Belgian law is
on par to that of a “paper tiger.”129 Denmark prosecuted and convicted a Bosnian Serb
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that was seeking asylum. Denmark based their claim to jurisdiction on breaches of
various articles of the third Geneva Convention.130 Canada, presents a mixed picture.
There is a well-staffed office to handle war crimes, but a recent ruling of the Canadian
Supreme Court laid down standards of proof so exacting as to make prosecution an
unrealistic option. Further, the stated policy of the government is to deport those
suspected of human rights violations rather than bring them to justice.131 France has
brought at least one individual associated to justice who was associated with the
Rwandan genocide. Interestingly, the jurisdiction for this was found in a law which
France had passed to give effect to Resolution 955 (the Resolution that created the
ICTR).132 Germany has been quite active in prosecuting individuals associated with the
former Yugoslavia, with four convictions on record as of the year 2000.133 The Supreme
Court of the Netherlands ruled that those accused of war crimes could be tried by a Dutch
military court on the basis of universal jurisdiction.134 As mentioned in footnote 140,
Senegal indicted the former leader of Chad on charges of torture.135 Spain, relying on the
passive personality principle of universal jurisdiction, has stated that Spanish courts have
jurisdiction try individuals connected with the violence of former governments in
Argentina and Chile.136 As discussed below, Switzerland has used a somewhat narrower

129

Id.

130

Id.

131

Id.

132

Id.

133

Id.

134

Id.

135

Id.

31

definition of universal jurisdiction, asserting that its courts cannot try cases on grounds of
genocide and crimes against humanity as those crimes are not recognized by Swiss penal
codes.137 The United Kingdom has law in place that would allow it to try those charged
with torture.138 The U.S. has similar law on its books.139
That several of the States discussed above have successfully incorporated some
form of universal jurisdiction into their laws is a sign of the growing acceptance of the
concept, but the inconsistency of its application and the effective preclusion of universal
jurisdiction to the legal system of some States speaks to its still uncertain place in the
world.
Indeed, other commentators have taken far more critical views of universal
jurisdiction. Some find its foundation to be seriously flawed.140 Many point to laws
against piracy as the conceptual beginning of universal jurisdiction. The argument is
made that piracy was treated as universally cognizable because it was such a heinous
crime.141 If this idea is accepted, it becomes fairly easy to apply similar logic to current
war criminals; the heinous nature of their crimes should make their crimes universally
cognizable. However dissenting voices call to holes in the conceptual framework that
would have piracy be the crime that birthed universal jurisdiction. Objections are based
on historical context. At the time that piracy became universally cognizable, state
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sponsored piracy existed in the form of privateering.142 The only difference between
piracy and privateering was that the privateer first secured permission sovereign to rob
civilian ships (and subsequently split the booty with the authorizing sovereign).143 If
universal jurisdiction is to be a viable force within international criminal law, it needs the
support of a solid foundation.
Others have pointed out the inconsistency in the application of Universal
Jurisdiction as a danger to the future of the idea and to the legitimacy of current
proceedings.144 Additionally, the fact that universal jurisdiction over the crime of
genocide is not explicitly recognized by the Genocide Convention places states in the
position of having to rely on customary international should they try to criminalize
genocide.145
1. Australia
Australian courts have illustrated the problem of genocide in their domestic
courts, in no uncertain terms stating:
“[T]he first issue for determination is whether an offense of genocide is known to
Australian law. It was submitted that offenses must now be recognized as a
consequence of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention of and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide by the Genocide Convention Act of 1949
(Commonwealth). I am unable to accept this submission. It is clear that while the
Act effectively ratifies the Convention it does not purport to incorporate the
provisions of the Convention into Australian municipal law. Consequently its
provisions cannot operate as a direct source of individual rights and obligations
142
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within Australia. The ratification of such a Convention may give rise to a
legitimate expectation or assist in the construction of an apparently ambiguous
statutory provision. Furthermore, an international law may be a legitimate and
important influence on the development of the common law, especially when
international law declares the existence of universal human rights. However, the
enactment of a statute ratifying a Convention cannot, of itself, give rise to the
implied creation of a new statutory offense, even though the Convention provides
that the contracting undertake to enact legislation to create offenses of that
character. 146

Additionally, the Court “acknowledged that international law might influence the
development of common law in Australia…common law does not necessarily conform to
international law.”147
The reluctance of Australia to adapt its common law to international law may also
be indicative of the difficulty built into making such substantive changes in a domestic
system. In order to comply with a resolution altering long held jurisdictional boundaries,
each State would have to follow their own processes to change their laws, in the event
that such a change would require constitutional changes, the implementation would
almost certainly be slow.148 At the same time, the slow process of change built into the
systems of many governments suggests that a resolution may be the only solution. It is
quite possible that even those governments that would like to ease the burden of the
ICTR need a pointed resolution to serve as a catalyst and justification for rapid change.
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While the London Conference points to a greater global willingness to try war
criminals, that State acceptance is still not a given. Indeed, political considerations help
to explain the small number of genocide cases being brought pursuant to universal
jurisdiction.149 Here, Australia’s stance may place them in violation of international
law.150
2. Switzerland
Swiss courts in attempting to try a Rwandan war criminal encountered a different
but equally relevant situation.151
In Nyonteze v. Public Prosecutor,152 Swiss authorities apprehended a Rwandan
national (Nyonteze) on their soil153 and charged him with the following violations of the
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Swiss Penal Code: “murder (Article 116), incitement to murder (Articles 22 and 116) and
violations of the laws and customs of war (Article 109). Counts of war crimes were
brought under Common Article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Convention and Article 4(2)(a) of
the Additional Protocol II.”154
The prosecutor sought and failed to amend the indictment to include genocide and
incitement to genocide, complicity in genocide, crimes against humanity, incitement to
commit crimes against humanity, and complicity in crimes against humanity.155 The
Swiss tribunal granted a defense motion to quash the proposed amendments on the
grounds that genocide and crimes against humanity as prescribed by customary
international were not “directly applicable in the Swiss legal order.”156
Nyonteze was initially convicted on the majority of the crimes he was charged
with and sentenced to life a term.157 However, on appeal the convictions for “common
crimes,” (murder and incitement to murder), were overturned due to lack of
jurisdiction.158 As such, a substantially lighter fifteen year sentence was handed down.159
Even if the trial of Nyonteze cannot be defined as an unqualified success, it serves
to demonstrate the willingness and the capacity of some States to apply the concept of
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universal jurisdiction.160 A binding Security Council resolution could serve as the tool by
which the concept of universal jurisdiction is standardized.
CONCLUSION
If the ICTR is to finish its work in time to be in line with its own completion
strategy, transference of some indictees to competent national jurisdictions is essential.
However, the global community is awash with different approaches to jurisdictional
definition. The UN Resolutions drafted to endorse the completion strategy do not
provide the necessary language or impetus for States to alter their laws.
Resolutions 1503 and 1534 do not contain language specific enough to compel
Member States to expand their jurisdiction.
However, there is precedent for resolutions that require States to change their
laws to be in compliance. Specifically, the resolutions passed pursuant to the
investigation that followed the bombing on Pan Am flight 103 and those passed after the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 required changes in State laws.
Universal jurisdiction, in its origins, application and status is too nebulous to be
relied upon. As such in lieu of an intervening act, its development is apt to languish in
some countries and develop haltingly in others.
The Security Council is endowed with broad powers. In the fulfillment of its
obligations under the UN charter, it could legally craft a resolution that authorizes or, if
need be, one compels States to expand their domestic jurisdictions, this would allow the
ICTR to finish its work on time and also greatly aid in the global development of
universal jurisdiction.
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